Abstract: This article uses the surviving correspondence between the Marquis of Anglesey and his land agent William Castleman to explore the relationship which existed between landowner, tenant and agent. The aim of this research has been to examine how these affiliations worked in practice through five broad but interconnecting themes which include: an investigation into the men who became agents, a survey of the changing patterns of land tenure, an evaluation of the estate's reaction to economic downturn, a study of the schemes used to alleviate tenant distress and an analysis of how these estate interactions were reflected in the repairs and improvements undertaken. Castleman was already an experienced attorney and land manager when he began to work for the estate and he and the Marquis developed overtime a deep and trusting business partnership. Consequently their correspondence has created a historical prism which this article has used to illustrate the working partnerships within this West Country locality.
The foundation of every estate was its tenants, for it was upon their survival that economic viability rested. A pivotal figure in large estates during this period was the land agent.
Historians have been responsible for portraying the role from an exclusively economic standpoint, as the man who collected the rent and compiled the bi-annual farm accounts. In reality they were often capable in both business and land-management, and their status and position meant they were a pivotal figure within the rural community. Surviving archives such as that of William Castleman examined here provide a unique historical perspective through which to examine the relationships which existed within estates and agrarian society. Richard Hoyle has reminded us in the preface to his recent publication The Farmer in England there is still 'so much that we don't know about farmers as individuals.' He argues that this lack of knowledge further extends to the methods used to capitalise on 'moments of agricultural prosperity' or the ways in which communities were able to survive 'generationlong episodes of depression'.
1 Furthermore, he argues that within the agricultural literature there exists a substantial corpus of knowledge relating to landowners, both collectively and singly, but the same is not true of the farmers. Researching the tenantry of any estate is frequently hampered by a lack of surviving records. Farmers in general relied heavily on spreading information through the spoken rather than written word. On the rare occasions when archives still exist they are frequently in the form of accounts, diaries and memoirs. Castleman who was an extremely methodical man, his correspondence; rental accounts and vouchers run into thousands of individual documents which together create an historical prism through which to study the rural community. A close textual examination of Castleman's archive has revealed the immense details contained in such records. Above all they detail the symbiotic relationship of landowner, agent and tenant. This article is intended to explore how this relationship worked in practice through five broad but interconnecting themes. There are first, a survey of the men who became agents and the role they undertook in estate management.
Secondly, it will explore the ideas surrounding changing land tenure during the first part of the nineteenth century. Thirdly, it will examine how the estate reacted to economic difficulties.
Fourthly consideration will be given to the schemes used to help alleviate tenant distress, and finally an investigation will be undertaken into the ways in which the relationship between landowner and tenant was expressed through repairs and improvements. This article will follow a thematic rather than a chronological approach and will begin with a brief study of the type of men who became agents and stewards.
I
By the eighteenth century the accrual of landed property in the hands of the aristocracy and wealthy gentry had already generated a demand for expert land managers. 3 Many owners spent long periods away from their estates and were frequently involved in affairs of state or participated in the various leisure activities that became increasingly popular. By employing an agent many landlords sought to relieve themselves of the burden of their daily estate responsibilities. The men employed to undertake this role were often unpopular. According to J. V. Beckett stewards were frequently viewed as 'rapacious, untrustworthy and weak willed'. enclosure, the development of mineral extraction, and the increased use of strict settlement brought the landed aristocracy and gentry increasingly into contact with the legal profession.
In fact the era has been described as 'the great age of conveyancing'. 12 The interaction between the two groups readily converted into land agency and management. An important and crucial part of the tripartite relationship under discussion can be found in the issues which surrounded land tenure and in particular the farm lease. Contemporary agricultural writers stressed the importance of long leases and condemned landowners who refused to issue them in the belief that this allowed them to dominate those who rented their land. It was argued that without security of tenure, a tenant could not be expected to invest the capital needed for improvement, particularly in the short term. 24 It took many years to formally terminate customary tenure and it was only after the slump in agricultural prices at the end of the Napoleonic Wars when tenants found their holdings uneconomic that change began. Leases for three lives or ninety-nine years were criticised because they were reliant on the survival of those named. Originally the intention of renting land in this manner was to entice tenants to keep the buildings in a good state of repair and to improve the quality of the soil and livestock.
Christopher Clay has argued that late eighteenth-century authorities including William
Marshall claimed that the lifehold and fining system resulted in bad farming. Ultimately it deprived the tenant of the capital he might otherwise have invested in his farm. 25 Many farms suffered from poor farming techniques and over-cropping in the last years of any given tenure.
On large farms it was common practice for landowners to use leases to protect against the loss of rental income and excessive damage to property. It was not unusual for husbandry clauses to be inserted and these frequently prescribed crop rotations in order to prevent the depletion of soil fertility by the excessive planting of white straw crops such as wheat, barley oats or rye.
Leases tended to be less popular for both landlord and tenant during periods of rapidly fluctuating prices. During upward trends in rental prices an owner who issued long leases could find his farms under-rented and his income reduced because tenants had fixed rent levels which were based on previously low agricultural prices. However, when movement occurred in the opposite direction tenants might be obligated to pay a level of rent that was no longer viable.
The tenant though was ultimately in the stronger position, for if prices declined sharply he might seek a rent rebate. On the other hand, it was rare for landlords to increase the rent in times of economic buoyancy. 26 Paying the fines which periodically became due when names were added to existing leases might in consequence have seemed a good investment. At least the land was secured for the next generation. It might be argued that this system benefitted the landowner, substantial. On 13 November 1825 Castleman sent sixteen leases to the Marquis for execution, the fines on these amounted to some £850 10s 0d. 27 Under this arrangement it was usual for the lifeholder to be responsible for most, if not all repairs upon his farm including buildings, hedges and even drainage. This was particularly appealing to any landowner when agricultural rents and prices were low. In reality granting a lease ensured that the landlord retained considerable control over his land through the insertion of wide-ranging clauses and covenants.
These might state the types of crops to be grown or the course of rotation to be employed. A lease might provide a schedule of repairs and improvements or it might legally bind the tenant to certain tasks at specific times in the farming calendar. Rack-renting was the opposite and using this system a farm was let from year to year and the rent adjusted accordingly. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many farmed as tenants-at-will that is without a formal lease. However such tenants did not fear eviction as many landowners wanted to keep their existing tenants, knew them personally, had confidence in their abilities and had become used to a steady income. In any case replacements were not always easy to find. 28 Those tenants who rack-rented were, according to Daunton, more likely to fall into arrears which might have financial implications for a struggling estate and owner. 29 The Marquis's opinion on leases does not concur with this suggestion and was clearly displayed in the note he personally wrote in the margin of a letter which had been returned to Castleman and which stated: This outburst had been occasioned by Withers, one of his tenants whose lease was due for renewal at Michaelmas and who was demanding an abatement of £243 4s 0d on a rent of £558 12s 0d. Castleman reported to the Marquis that while the current poor agricultural prices might justify this enormous allowance he could not advise his 'Lordship to accept it without first making the attempt to realise a higher rent'. 31 The Marquis supposed it would be better to keep
Withers -a respectable tenant -rather 'than take an adventurer at a trifling advance of Rent'. Castleman believed only 120 acres a year would be planted with wheat, and would produce fifteen bushels per acre at £13 per load. The rent was therefore assessed at £585 per annum. In total 480 acres were to be farmed under the above system and the remaining land was to be planted with sainfoin or left as ley. The rent would be re-evaluated based on the price of wheat in the 'County of Dorset' on the four quarter days of Lady Day, Midsummer, Michaelmas and
Christmas. The lease stated that over a four-year period chalk was to be applied to some 300 acres at the rate of one bushel per acre. The Marquis was to bear half the cost of this, and the tenant was to pay all the tithes but was allowed 'rough timber' for any necessary repairs over the twelve-year period of the lease. 35 Produce rents were accepted as a fair way of sharing the advantages and disadvantages caused by high and low prices between landowner and tenant.
On the whole, according to F. M. L. Thompson they were relatively rare, perhaps because of the chore of determining the average price of wheat and the rent so frequently. Castleman made an example of one miscreant. He reported to the Marquis that he had resorted 'to legal measures' to compel one of the tenants 'to cleanse a part of a Brook adjoining his land which completely obstructed the Water'. 39 As a result of the court's ruling the tenant found himself ordered to clear the waterway and to pay costs. This action had the desired effect and unsurprisingly his neighbours followed suit.
It has been argued that during the nineteenth century there was general shift away from the away from copyhold and lifehold tenancies and this movement was aided by the introduction of a new form of finance, the mortgage. This allowed owners to raise money independent of their landed property. However, in the Marquis of Anglesey's case he used both methods, but it is hard to ascertain precisely how much he eventually borrowed. from whom the Marquis had borrowed £6000, requiring it to be paid off when it fell due, unless he was prepared to raise the interest rate to five per cent. Castleman stated that he thought this was higher than the general rate which was closer to four and a half per cent. 43 Despite the rise in the use of mortgages as a means of credit the estate continued to issue leases up to the point of sale in 1854. As Castleman preferred this method of renting land and property, believing that it provided greater security for the estate rather than the tenant, he probably did much to influence this decision. There is no doubt that during periods of financial and economic difficulties the tenants turned to the landlord for help and assistance.
III
Mingay wrote that 'Much of an agent's time was absorbed by the day to day dealings with the tenants'. 44 Besides collecting rents, the agent often found himself in the unenviable position of having to balance the relationships between landowner and tenants. The tenants expected the agent to examine their requests for rent rebates or reductions and decide whether these were justly deserved, put into place schemes and ideas to relief distress, ensure necessary repairs were undertaken and drive forward agricultural improvements. Ultimately the aim was to ensure that the estate made a profit and that the tenants remained loyal to the Marquis of Castleman had described the corn harvest of 1828 as being 'not only deficient in quantity' but also 'defection in quality' and 'generally injured by the Rains'. 46 The worst of the summer rains, Stratton stated, were concentrated in the period July 6 to August 14. The downpours in early July were particularly violent and resulted in extensive flooding. Corn fields were laid flat while hay and livestock were washed away. 47 In 1829 the estate was hit by 'coathe'. The estate is situated in the area of southern England which, when conditions are right, provides the perfect breeding ground for a small water snail, which is the host to the liver fluke. When warm and wet weather prevails this mollusc breeds rapidly. 48 Losses varied, the smallest was of a single cow valued at £7 belonging to William Harris which perished, while the largest fatalities of livestock affected Highmore whose entire flock of 1000 sheep worth £1200 was wiped out. 49 In an attempt to aid those who had suffered the most, rent allowances were allowed from 10 to 25 per cent. All together the estate rebated £1401, or approximately 13 per cent of the anticipated income from those whose animals were affected. 50 The problems caused by this disaster were more than financial. Marquis. Castleman discovered that he was seeking to borrow money to pay off the debt and hoped that he would succeed, otherwise he would be totally ruined. As a result of the economic downturn it appeared that it was 'more than probable that a very great sacrifice' would be made on re-letting the farm.
60
The temptation must have existed to evict tenants who fell behind with their rental payments, but this was not always the answer. Once a tenant had been given notice to quit it was necessary to find someone else to rent the property. During periods of financial insecurity it might prove necessary to accept a lower rent from the incoming tenant. It was therefore a juggling act: was a tenant allowed to remain in situ and accrue arrears in the hope that prices might improve and the debt paid off, or, should one accept the losses and a lower but safer rental? During the crisis of 1821-22 Castleman charted the increase in tenant indebtedness in line with the Marquis' policy of allowing rent arrears to accumulate. Arrears during this period for the tenants more than doubled from £4228 2s 12d to £9088 3s 1d. During this crisis even farms of long-standing tenants finally failed. In 1822 a distraint was levied on Samuel Harris
Junior of Stalbridge, in spite of the fact that his arrears were relatively small at £297 10s 10d.
This move had been undertaken with some reluctance as sadly the family had been tenants of both the Marquis of Anglesey and his predecessor Mr Walters. 61 Securing at least some form of payment towards outstanding arrears was at the heart of any form of legal action. The estate does not appear to be without sympathy. After the goods of the Harris family had been sold
Castleman ordered the return of their household goods, stating that they 'were of little value in any case'. 62 There were few problems re-letting Harris's farm, and by renting it to two tenants instead of one he was able to procure an increase on the previous rent of £18 9s 6d per annum.
63
The estate was not always so benevolent especially when tenants acted fraudulently, as in the case of Daw and Barrett who dishonestly drove off their stock of cattle. 64 The Marquis insisted they be prosecuted, and this measure was 'adopted for the discouragement' of any future tenants who might attempt the same. 65 Daw and Barrett applied for the debt to be discharged under the Insolvency Act, but the estate opposed the action and ultimately the pair found themselves sentenced to eight months imprisonment. his tenants there were times when financial expediency had to be at the forefront of any decisions made. It is wrong to assume that any theories or schemes implemented were merely rent abatements or that all sectors of the rural community were affected simultaneously.
The circumstances in 1817 illustrated this diversity. The corn farmers were beginning to recover from the drop in prices at the end of the Napoleonic Wars while the grass farmers continued to be 'very much distressed'. In response to the changing conditions the gratuitous allowance made to the arable sector was reduced to eight per cent while those of the pastoral group were increased to ten. 69 Evidence for the start of a recovery is reflected in the decrease in rent arrears which fell from a high of £12, 483 2s 9d in 1816 to £8,044 18s 10d in 1817.
Signs that the 'grass' farmers were still struggling started to become apparent again in July 1819. Receipts from the audit which had been held that month had fallen short of the perceived payments. The deteriorating state of affairs was exacerbated because the Hanley tenants did not pay until the middle of August and several of the other large tenants did not pay until they had sold their sheep in August and October. 70 By 1820 the situation had not improved and
Castleman was forced to make a decision in an attempt to improve matters. Rather than offering an immediate rent allowance he simply suggested to the Marquis that in line with other principal landowners in the area, including Lord Shaftsbury and Mr Bankes, the Christmas audit be postponed until the beginning of March. Castleman was concerned that if the tenants were forced to sell their produce they would be unable to raise sufficient funds to pay the rent.
It transpired that many farmers were already using their own capital merely to survive. 71 The crisis of 1835 and 1836 occurred in the wake of Swing which Carl Griffin stated continued 'to live on in the public mind' both as the mythical leader of a pseudo-movement of the poor and a demonstration of broader tensions within the rural community. 72 During the unrest Castleman had stated that granting concessions to the 'marauders' was out of the question and that the protestors should be swiftly put down or 'we shall shortly have them for our governors'. 73 During the problems of 1835-36 the estate considered and integrated the labourers within the solution proffered. The problems which began with the bumper harvests of 1832 and continued for the next four years caused the price of wheat to drop until it reached a mere 35s 4d a quarter. Castleman reported to the Marquis, 'the price of wheat for the last two years has been almost ruinous to the farmers' and he remained convinced that in general it had not 'produced one sixpence to pay rent'. 74 As a result the tenants began to clamour for rent rebates on 'account of the long continued low prices of wheat'. 75 Then in late 1835 the turnip crop which was usually grown for fattening sheep during the winter months failed. In January 1836 Castleman reported that the consequences of this disaster are 'not yet fully known'. 76 There were parallels between these new problems and those of 1830, as both arose during the winter months and there were echoes of the conditions which precipitated Swing. Consequently a plan was quickly assembled which allowed those who rented corn farms an immediate ten per cent off their gross rental.
In application the scheme was more complicated as certain conditions applied. No abatement was granted to those farmers whose annual rent was less than £20 per annum. A vital part of the concession was the proviso that the half year's rent due at Michaelmas was to be paid in full; no-one was expected to make any contribution towards their arrears. Fifty per cent of the reduction was to be applied immediately the rent was paid. The remaining 50 per cent was to be retained until the tenant had expended at least the same in 'draining, trenching or other improvements … on the enclosed Meadows and Pasture land on his farms'. 77 Once a tenant had determined the works to be undertaken, a schedule was to be submitted in writing to Castleman for his approval. Payment would only be made after Castleman had inspected and approved the works which had been carried out. Vouchers had to be produced which detailed the sums spent. This was to exclude the cost of carriage of any materials which the tenants were expected to find personally. There was a second and very important philosophy behind the proposed scheme and this was the notion that once fully operational it would ensure the employment of any surplus labour in the neighbourhood. This would help to mitigate any charge on the parish or the risk of labourers starving and the possibility of further protests.
Castleman declared that where practicable the labourers should be paid by piece-work. This would mean 'that both the industrious and the lazy' were 'paid in proportion' to their 'exertions'. Moreover this scheme had the potential to keep 'the pauper population' in the 'neighbourhood orderly' and acquiesce to the 'Provisions of the New Poor Law'. 78 The estate sought to turn an economically difficult situation to its advantage. The low prices were short lived and by 1838 had risen again to 64s 7d per quarter. 79 In the meantime the plan of improvements ensured the value of the land was not simply maintained but increased. There is some evidence that on this occasion local land-agents acted as a cartel. When trying to persuade the Marquis to adopt the scheme Castleman stated that similar provisions had been made on his own land, that of Mr Bankes and other estates in the area.
VI
The landlord-tenant partnership was unified and exemplified in the execution of some of the more laborious improvements, for example drainage, clearance of the land, marling and repairs. 80 At the commencement of Castleman's agency in 1814 the estate was in a poor condition, and in 1815 he stated 'I am sorry to say the farms are in a shocking state' of repair.
81
The late nineteenth and early twentieth-century agricultural writer C. E. Repairs are always a difficult subject … But it may be noticed that the basis of the contract should always be that the premises are in good and tenantable repair at the time of entry by the tenant and the liability undertaken by him should be worded in accordance with this assumption. 82 As a result of Castleman's observations in 1818 a survey was undertaken and a detailed list of repairs drawn up. The only schedule which appears to have survived is that which pertained to Robert Davis at Yenston Farm. It divided the work required between Davis and the estate. In reality there was little difference between either landlord or tenant requirements. Both entailed an amount of thatching and the repair of walls and roofs in order to put both the farm and its buildings into a decent state of repair. Altogether the Marquis expended some £41 12s 8d. It is assumed that agents in the past had neglected the estate's responsibilities as the schedule stated:
'When the repairs have been done … as stated the whole of the Marquis of Anglesey's Covenant in the lease of Yenston Farm will be fulfilled'. 83 By 1822 the majority of the work on the estate which had been outstanding appears to have been completed and Castleman wrote in his report that the repairs on all the farms were in general 'satisfactory'. 84 The landowner was recognised as the chief provider of capital for improvements in the nineteenth century. On the Buccleuch estates in 1804, when drainage was first mentioned in the accounts, allowances were granted to the tenants for half the costs. From 1822 the estate provided half the outlay spent on draining materials and the labour was found by the tenants, and this remained so until the 1880s. 85 Even with the recognition of draining as a landlord improvement, the amount expended was dependent on either the financial buoyancy of the estate or the sum an individual owner was prepared to invest. 86 Lord Ernle had argued that drainage was the solution for many of the problems experienced by both arable and pastoral farmers. Heavy un-drained land was difficult to cultivate in wet seasons, the growing season was shorter, it quickly became overgrown with 'moisture loving' plants which stole important nutrients, it checked the growth of grass, had a tendency to become water logged and could prove fatal to feed stock off, as in 1829. Expensive manure or fertilizer was rendered ineffectual if applied to wet land, as it quickly became too diluted to be of any benefit. 87 The Marquis of Anglesey on his Dorset and Somerset estate used both the systems which had previously been employed by the Buccleuch estates. The vouchers contain numerous references to the allowances made to the tenant farmers in relation to under-draining. For each scheme carried out a percentage of the costs were consequently deducted from their rent. In 1831 on land around Stalbridge the estate spent £740 on turf-draining, the quarrying of stone for benching, the construction of open carriers and back ditching. 88 The best illustration of a landowner-tenant partnership for this type of improvement was through an indenture made between the Marquis and Ralph Ironside which was executed in 1820. The contract ordered that
Ironside was 'to forthwith effectually drain the said Bradford Leaze in a proper and incontrovertible measure'. It included precise sums to be paid for certain aspects of the work.
For example, Ironside was to 'dig the carriers' at 'eight pence per Grad', the small work 'at two pence farthing per Grad' and for the underground drains' he was to receive a further 'eight pence per Grad'. 89 On completion Ironside was to be recompensed with an additional £10 for his labour. A number of vouchers have survived for this arrangement and overall Ironside overall received a total of £91 18s 0d. 90 Other expenses included a payment to John Spencer of rents. This estate demonstrates that rather than being universal the change was far more fragmented. The Marquis of Anglesey reflected this growing dislike of long leases but the influence of Castleman ensured that they did not become obsolete and provides an idea of the amount of power and influence agents could exert over the day-to-day management. On the one hand the Marquis considered that his leasehold tenants were the most troublesome and thus this method of renting land was to cease. His agent on the other decreed that this was the safest and most secure method of ensuring that the tenants paid their rent, and he inserted clauses which guaranteed the farmers would use the best methods of maintaining soil quality and the upkeep of the farm buildings. Without this method Castleman did not believe that he would be able to procure any tenants without the promise of a long tenancy. This is the different to most accounts and is indicative of the individuality of the tripartite relationship that pertains between the three main elements of the rural community.
The most obvious examples of the affiliations which existed are represented through the repairs and improvements carried out. While these are frequently debated by historians the drainage indenture of Ralph Ironside and the repair schedule of Robert Davis expand the more general assumptions. Furthermore, they explore and survey how tenant and landowner worked in tandem. Both understood the responsibilities and duties expected of the other and the socioeconomic framework within which to execute these obligations. Besides helping to maintain the fabric of the estate, there was an unspoken agreement that the landowner would support his tenants during periods of economic downturn. This article illustrates the extent to which arrears were allowed to accumulate and it is surprising how infrequently distraints actually took place.
Other approaches to low prices were to delay the audit, or allow rental abatements. In 1836 the mode of action utilised demonstrated how an agent who was prepared to think laterally could produce a scheme that not only aided the tenants and those they employed but also increased the value of the land. The paternalistic approach taken halted the distress and made certain that when conditions improved the tenants were able to take advantage of the changing economic circumstances.
Many relationships within the rural community were of a fragile nature but that between the Marquis, Castleman and the tenantry were based on an unspoken and unwritten contract.
While the leases issued were a tangible, visual proof of the commitment of both parties to farm efficiently the framework provided by the estate was perhaps more important. It was understood that generally both sides would undertake their own liabilities and for both parties the facilitator and keeper of this partnership was Castleman. He was trusted by the Marquis and the agent-in-chief to do his best for the estate but his longevity in the position and the fact that the tenants would personally approach him during difficult periods is indicative of the trust placed in him. The symbiotic relationship which existed between these three sections of agrarian society are vital to our understanding of the way in which it functioned and was organised and manage. Further research is needed to establish how these relationships worked at differing local and regional level so that national trends can be more readily be ascertained.
